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This paper introduces and explains the various branches of Artificial
Intelligence and Law, summarises past and present activities within both Europe
and the rest of the world and, on a practical level, considers the feasibility and the
benefits of these systems as well as the problems to which they give rise. It then
points to the keys to successful development.
I ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is concerned with the design, development and
implementation of computer systems that can perform tasks and solve problems of
a sort for which human intelligence is normally thought to be required. For
example, AI programs have been written to understand the spoken word, to
translate from one language into another, and to recognise images and objects in
the physical world.
Artificial intelligence as applied in the legal field can be sub-divided into two
categories: expert systems and knowledge-based systems; and enhancements to
legal information retrieval systems.
Expert systems and knowledge-based systems
The broadly agreed goal of workers in the fields of expert systems and
knowledge-based systems is to use computer technology to make scarce expertise
and knowledge more widely available and easily accessible. Expert and
knowledge-based systems are therefore computer applications that contain
knowledge and expertise which they can apply - much as a human expert does - in
solving problems, offering advice and undertaking a variety of other tasks. In law,
these systems should be able to apply their legal knowledge in guiding users
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through complex legal issues; in identifying solutions to problems; in planning
tasks; compiling documents and managing the flow of cases; and in offering advice
and making specific recommendations.
If there is any distinction at all between expert systems and knowledge-based
systems, it is that the former are more powerful than (and are a subset of) the latter
in that the former hold expertise and not just knowledge. There is a more
fundamental set of distinctions, however, and that is between types of expert
systems (the term hereafter used to refer both to expert systems and knowledge-
based systems). There are currently five identifiable classes of expert systems as
applied in law.
I. Diagnostic systems
These systems offer specific solutions to problems presented to them. From the
facts of any particular case, as elicited by such a system, it will analyse the details
and draw conclusions, usually after some kind of interactive consultation. These
systems are analogous to the medical diagnostic systems which make diagnoses on
the basis of symptoms presented to them. An example of a diagnostic system in law
would be a taxation system that could pinpoint the extent to which and why a
person is liable to pay tax, doing so on the basis of a mass of details provided to it.
2. Planning systems
In a sense, planning systems reason in reverse. For these systems are instructed as
to a desired solution or outcome and their purpose is to identify scenarios,
involving both factual and legal premises, that justify the preferred conclusion. In
tax law, a planning system could recommend how best a taxpayer should arrange
his affairs so as to minimise his exposure to liability. The knowledge held within
planning systems can be very similar to that held within diagnostic systems; what
. is quite different is the way that that knowledge is applied.
3. Procedural guides
Many complex tasks facing legal professionals require extensive expertise and
knowledge that is in fact procedural in nature. Expert systems as procedural
guides take their users through such complex and extended procedures, ensuring
that all matters are attended to and done within any prescribed time periods. An
example of such a system would be one that managed the flow of a complex tax
evasion case, providing detailed guidance and support from inception through to
final disposal.
4. The intelligent checklist
This category of system assists in auditing or reviewing compliance with legal
regulations. Compliance reviews must be undertaken with relentless attention to
detail and extensive reference to large bodies of regulations. Intelligent checklists
provide a technique for performing such reviews. They formalise the process. In
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taxation, an intelligent checklist approach could be used to assist in the review of a
company's compliance with corporation tax.
5. Document modelling systems
These systems - also referred to as document assembly systems - store templates
set up by legal experts. These templates contain fixed portions of text together
with precise indications as to the conditions under which given extracts should be
used. In operation, such a system will elicit from its user all the details relevant to a
proposed document. This is done by the user answering questions, responding to
prompts and providing information. On the basis of the user's input, the system
will automatically generate a customised and polished document on the basis of its
knowledge of how its text should be used.
Enhancements to legal information retrieval systems
Although legal information retrieval systems such as Lexis have dominated the
field of computers in law, these systems nevertheless have serious shortcomings.
Often they retrieve an excess of irrelevant documents, or alternatively not all
pertinent documents within the data-base are located during every consultation.
There ismuch more to legal problem-solving than searching for the occurrence of
words within documents and, in recognition of this, researchers have sought to
improve the performance of legal information retrieval systems by using AI
techniques. Two approaches can be adopted here: the introduction of a "front-
end"; and the deployment of conceptual retrieval techniques.
1.Front-ends
The idea here is that guidance on the use of an interactive system is offered to users
before searching within the database commences. Such a front-end system will
help the user actually formulate his search request. It will ask the user questions,
help to pinpoint relevant terms and concepts, and help ensure that all but only the
relevant documents are retrieved. Front-ends can be built using classical
"knowledge engineering" IAI techniques - they can embody the knowledge of
experts in the use of legal information retrieval systems and make that expertise
available to others.
2. Conceptual retrieval
Those who argue that there is more to legal problem-solving than ,searching for
keywords will often suggest that legal reasoning and research involves familiarity
and manipulation of legal concepts. Accordingly, researchers have developed
methods of augmenting the traditional approach with conceptual retrieval
techniques which will allow users to search through massive bodies of legal data,
not just on the basis of the occurrence of keywords but in terms of the fundamental
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concepts relating to any problem at hand. This could mean, for example, that
systems will search not only for words expressly articulated by the user, but also
for terms conceptually implicit in such requests.
The above analysis focuses on the functions of AI systems in law but says little of
the enabling technologies. In developing expert systems or enhanced legal
information retrieval systems, researchers have drawn and will continue to draw
on a wide range of AI techniques. Over and above the techniques and methods
normally associated with expert systems, workers in artificial intelligence and law
increasingly make use, in particular, of natural language processing and neural
computing.
II HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section of the paper is to put the field of AI and law in
historical context. It proposes a four stagemodel in terms of which activities in the
field can be analysed and classified.
The four stages of evolution in the field of AI and law
Activities in the field of law and AI tend to progress through four key stages:
negligible activity; preliminary research; extensive research and development; and
commercial exploitation. Although these stages overlap, each has characteristics
unique to it.
1. Stage 1 - Negligible activity
During this stage, there are no sustained attempts to carry out serious scientific
investigations into the topic. Nevertheless, and even in the days prior to the
coming of the computer, in this first stage there may still be considerable
speculation about what might be called the mechanisation of the legal problem
solving process. Some contributions in this connection may be no more than
fictional, but others show remarkable foresight of the potential and the dangers of
computerising legal reasoning.
2. Stage 2 - Preliminary research
Eventually, speculation and fiction give way to the desire to inquire into the field
more thoroughly and rigorously. In this second stage, the preliminary research
will lay the foundations for later and larger initiatives, but at this stage work is
confined largely to exploring AI and law from a theoretical perspective.
Researchers may be from law as well as from the world of computing. Perhaps
surprisingly, Stage 2 is often dominated by the latter tradition - it is computer
scientists' basic research that will establish the technical feasibility of building AI
systems in law and will stimulate lawyers into further inquiry.
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3. Stage 3 - Extensive research and development
The potential of the field having been established during Stage 2, there will follow
a period of great activity, involving many research projects, largely devoted to the
development of prototype systems and demonstrators. At the same time,
fundamental, theoretical research will continue and will have direct impact on the
research and development projects. In this stage, as in the previous two, work will
largely be confined to academic establishments. The findings of Stage 3 will
progress AI in law from the research laboratory into the marketplace.
4. Stage 4 - Commercial exploitation
In this final stage, commercial organisations explore the technology with a view to
profitable development. These organisations will draw heavily from Stage 3
activities, not simply in borrowing ideas but also in recruiting staff. The stage of
commercial exploitation itself can be subdivided into several phases, each
representing varying degrees of success and financial gain. The key feature of
Stage 4 activities is their commercial orientation - there is little concern for theory,
although it must be stressed that Stage 3 research and development will still
continue (at increasingly advanced levels) in parallel with Stage 4 activity.
A brief history of artificial intelligence and law
The four stage model set out above can be used in analysing the worldwide
history of the field.
Stage 1would correspond to the time period before 1970. During that period,
visionaries, science fiction writers, and technologically oriented lawyers wrote on
the topic of computers engaging in legal reasoning and even replacing judges.
Interesting though these contributions were, they were often detached from the
technical realities and from the nature of the legal process.
It was not until 1970 that work began in earnest. This was the beginning of
about five years' preliminary research - Stage 2 activity. Buchanan and Headrick,
a computer scientist and lawyer from Stanford University, published the first
detailed analysis of the field in 1970. Shortly afterwards, a man who is now
considered to be the father of the field, Thorne McCarty, began his TAXMAN
project, which was to run well into the 1980s. Other key projects during that
period were carried out by Meldman in the United States, Popp and Schlink in
Germany, Sprowl in the United States and Stamper in England. Collectively,
these workers and a few others, undertook the preliminary research that has served
as the foundation for more ambitious work over the last fifteen years.
During the decade between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s there emerged
about 30 sustained research and development projects throughout the world.
These projects built upon the Stage 2 work, lending further credence to it by
developing operational systems that demonstrated the potential of the field so
much more clearly than abstract reports could ever have done. Important projects
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during this stage were conducted at the Rand Corporation in California, Imperial
College in London, the Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law in
Oslo, and in England's Open University and Oxford University. It is interesting to
note that the work of these projects - during the world's Stage 3- emanated more
from institutions than from individuals. The findings and products of these
research and development programs attracted interest not only within the
computing and legal communities but also in the popular press. In turn, the
commercial world began to take greater interest.
From 1985onwards, Stage 4 commercial exploitation came about. The findings
of earlier research projects were combined with the teachings of traditional data
processing and constrained by the pragmatic demands of profit-making
organisations. It must be stressed, however, that even on a world-wide basis,
commercial exploitation of AI in the legal field is still, in 1990, at a very early
phase, for returns on investments so far have been low (with the exception of the
use of document modelling systems in the United States).
It should be said, finally, in this brief history of AI and law, that there have now
emerged, quite clearly, two types of worker in the field. On the one hand, there is
the 'pragmatist' whose overriding aim is to develop and implement commercial
systems that can actually assist in the solving ofIegal problems. On the other hand,
there is the 'purist', for whom completion even ofmodest prototypes is not always
necessary for success. The major goals of the purist are to clarify the nature oflega!
reasoning, of human and artificial intelligence and of computational models oflaw.
Live systems are not necessary for this. Generally, pragmatists operate in the
commercial world, while purists can be found in research establishments.
Pragmatists are at Stage 4 of the evolutionary path outlined earlier; while purists
remain at Stage 3, often with no intention of being involved in Stage 4 activities.
In assessing contributions to the field of AI and law, it is important to bear in
mind this distinction between pragmatist and purist approaches. It is crucial to
appreciate that workers in these camps have in mind quite different goals and their
orientations often diverge radically. There must be room in the world of AI and
law for both pragmatists and purists. Indeed it is essential that contributions
emerge from both camps. Equally crucial is that neither claims superiority over
the other. Above all, perhaps, collaboration between the two is desirable.
III PRACTICAL ISSUES
This section seeks to offer answers to four questions often asked by persons
interested in exploiting the potential that AI and expert systems techniques offer
for the law. (Note that hereinafter the term "expert system" is often used in place
of "AI" as it is this branch of AI that is attracting the greatest commercial
interest.) The four questions are as follows:
Is it feasible to build artificially intelligent systems in the legal domain?
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What are the benefits of this approach?
What problems are there for workers in this field?
What are the keys to success?
This section deals with each of these questions in tum.
Questions of feasibility
People unfamiliar with the field will often say that it is not possible or not
feasible to build expert systems in law. Careful analysis of this essertion, however,
reveals that there are really five dimensions to this feasibility issue; that there are
really five questions to be answered. These questions askwhether building expert
systems in law is technically possible, jurisprudentially sound, commercially
via~le, organisationally suitable and strategically appropriate.
1. Technical possibility
The key issue here is whether hardware and software in the field of AI has
developed to such an extent that sound, reliable and robust systems can be
designed, developed, implemented, tested and maintained. It is now widely
accepted that expert systems have matured to such an extent that technologies and
techniques are indeed now available, in 1990,to support the development - at least
- of what might be termed 'first generation' systems. Generally, such systems will
be stand-alone, will operate in small problem domains, will not be capable of
solving all problems that human experts can, but nevertheless will deliver
appreciable business benefits.
2. Jurisprudential soundness
Any expert system in law necessarily makes assumptions about the nature of law
and of legal reasoning. Accordingly, there is a growing literature on the
philosophical implications and presuppositions of building such systems. Some
theorists have suggested that building such systems is to misrepresent, distort and
oversimplify the legal problem-solving process. Others have argued there to be a
direct match between what the computer can do and what legal reasoning is all
about. However, the view that has been most widely supported, and is now gaining
even greater acceptance, is that there are no fundamental objections from the point
of view of legal philo~ophy to building expert systems in law of limited scope.
These limitations in scope refer to the category of proper user (the lawyer or legally
informed person); the way in which such a system should be used (as an 'intelligent
assistant' and not a replacement for a legal expert); and the limitations of solving
.problems on the basis only of legal rules (so that these systems currently cannot
reason on the basis of legal principle, policy or purpose).
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3. Organisational suitability
Even if it is technically possible and jurisprudentially proper to build these
systems, it must always be asked whether such a system could actually function
effectively in any target organisation. Some users of the systems might feel
de-skilled; others may feel uncomfortable about interacting with computer
systems rather than human beings; while still others will lack the confidence to
operate any computer system of whatever sort. This question offeasibility is often
overlooked by enthusiasts and champions of the field. Yet, from a purely practical
point of view, many systems of the future will be regarded as failures precisely
because they will not have been integrated with and accepted by the organisation
for which they were developed.
4. Commercial viability
The costs associated with developing expert systems in law are considerable. Not
only are skilled computer professionals required, but if possible extensive time,
effort and therefore cost of human experts will also be expended. For an expert
system in law to succeed in the commercial world, the benefits that accrue from its
deployment must outweigh these substantial outlays. A major difficulty here,
however, is the notorious difficulty of quantifying the benefits of this technology:
for many ofthe benefits, as shall be seen from the next part of this report, are of an
intangible sort. A major challenge for this field, therefore, is to provide guidance
on the compilation of cost/benefit analyses of systems.
5. Strategic relevance
Complete commitment to this emerging technology may be further inhibited by a
perception that even if these systems can be built, their operation would not sit
comfortably with the nature of the organisation for which they are being
developed. It may be, for instance, that a firm of solicitors decides not to be heavily
involved with any sort of technology, but to offer a distinctively 'human' service.
For such a firm, even if systems could profitably be developed, they may be
deemed to be strategically inappropriate. The strategic question associated with
these syste~s is, therefore, whether their use supports the wider strategic and
business objectives of the organisation considering their introduction.
Significantly, since 1987, the first two questions - about technical and
jurisprudential feasibility- have been asked less frequently. Operational systems
have themselves, in effect, responded positively. These two questions are the key
concerns of those in Stage 3of the evolutionary path. In the world arena, the focus
now is on the third and fourth questions - whether these systems can offer
sufficient p'ayback and fit into organisations considering their introduction.
Frankly, it is too early to be able to answer these questions with confidence. Early
indications of Stage 4 are very encouraging; so what seems certain is that further
investment and investigation is necessary. The fifth question, the one relating to
strategy, will be the dominant question of the mid- to late 1990s.
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The benefits
There are two main categories of benefits. First, there is the benefit from a
human resource perspective. Second, there is the impact on quality.
1.Human resources
The central idea of expert systems technology is to allow human knowledge and
expertise to be distributed more effectively and efficiently. This dissemination of
scarce expertise will give rise to a range of improvements in the way human
resources can be managed. Using the technology, complex tasks, which in the past
would have required the attention of experts, can now be reliably delegated to less
experienced persons. These users will benefit from access to first-rate expertise
that would have been possible previously only through direct interaction with
human experts (whose time would inevitably have been limited). This possibility
of delegating tasks and activities could go some way to overcoming the anticipated
skills shortages that are likely to prevail in the 1990s. There are training
implications here too: in operating these systems, users will gain considerable
insight into the knowledge and techniques necessary and sufficient for first class
performance in the legal problem-solving arena.
Additionally, expert systems will allow the expertise of many experts to be
synthesised and preserved. More than this, they will also perform a liberating
function. For it is likely that expert systems will be used largely to assist in the
performance of many tasks that for experts are mundane or routine, although in
the past required their attention. If expert systems can assist in such tasks, then
they will free experts to focus on what they do best - and what are likely to be
beyond the scope of computer systems for some time yet - namely, the tackling
and solving of problems that are complex and difficult even for experts.
2. Quality
Expert systems will also enhance the quality of legal work. By preserving and
making widely available scarce legal expertise and in essentially codifying that
knowledge, the technology can promote a uniformity of approach to similar
problems, a consistency of disposal, and an in-built quality control regime.
Moreover, computer systems will not suffer from "off-days" that so often inhibit
the performance of human beings.
It is difficult to quantify with precision the human resource and qualitative
benefits just noted. Nevertheless, the major dimensions of financial benefit can
easily be identified. For the profit oriented organisation, expert systems will allow
greater leverage, that is, a higher proportion of lower paid to higher paid
employees, while retaining the same quality and quantity (at least) of workload.
The technology will also facilitate "value-billing", whereby the charge for legal
services will be based not on the time spent on a task multiplied by some hourly
rate; rather, the task itself will have been automated and so undertaken far more
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quickly or at far lower cost. Value-billing gives rise to charges equivalent to those
that would be incurred under conventional billing systems. Yet the task for which
the charge is being made will have incurred far less cost for the provider.
For the public service based organisation, such as a government legal
department, the financial benefits of using the technology result from the
possibility of substantially reducing the cost of the services delivered by the
department. The technology will allow tasks to be undertaken by less costly staff in
fewer hours while increasing the quality of the work.
While it is easy to identify the sources of profit derived from expert systems
generally, it is far more difficult to quantify these benefits in particular cases. As
mentioned earlier, a key challenge for those involved with the commercial
exploitation of AI and law is the articulation of techniques for precisely analysing
the financial costs and benefits of building systems.
Problems and obstacles
A number of problems and obstacles have faced and will continue to confront
those wishing to build expert systems in the legal area. Six major problems deserve
mention.
1. Lack of knowledge engineers
The person whose task it is to "mine the jewels" from human experts' heads, then
articulate that knowledge and finally embody it in a computer system, is known as
the "knowledge engineer". To be effective in this task, the know lege engineer
must have considerable knowledge both of computer technology and of the law.
Unfortunately, there are few people with training in both these disciplines. This
lack of potential knowledge engineers will continue to inhibit the number of
systems that are developed.
2. Lack of domain experts
The source of knowledge and expertise for any expert system is the human expert
himself. This domain expert must work closely with the knowledge engineer and
this is a very time consuming process. It is not easy to convince an expert to devote
extensive periods of time that could otherwise be used for chargeable work or more
direct legal service. Yet, without the commitment of the expert to a project, no
system can be developed. Understandably, few experts so far have shown the
degree of commitment required.
3. Lack of method
Modern data processing is characterised by the use of so-called "methodologies";
that detailed sets of carefully and clearly formulated standard practices and
procedures to guide those developing systems. In contrast, no such methodology
exists for the development of expert systems in the legal area and so designers of
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these systems are required to face the same obstacles and hurdles that others have
faced and overcome in the past.
4. Lack of tools
Other than for the development of document modelling systems, there are, as yet,
no commercially available software packages devoted to the development of expert
systems in law. Today, designers of systems are compelled to use tools not ideally
suited to the task and inefficiency and inaccuracy inevitably result.
5. Quality controldifficulties
Amajor problem facing the AI community generally is the difficulty of controlling
the quality of systems under development. It is enormously difficult to test the
reliability and accuracy of the knowledge held within these systems, to test the
soundness of the underlying code and to audit their performance. A fully
articulated methodology, of course, would address this issue of quality control.
6. Legal implications
There can be no doubt that some reluctance to develop fully operational systems
has its roots in concern over the legal implications of expert systems in law giving
rise to loss. The expert system as a source of information and advice seems to sit
somewhere between the professional adviser on the one hand and the text book on
the other. However, there have been no decided cases on the issue ofIiability for
expert systems, and while this uncertainty prevails, so too will some reluctance to
develop the technology further.
Keys to success
The fourth and final question often asked of expert systems in law looks for
guidance on the successful development of systems. Drawing on international
findings, there follows a listing of ten keys to success.
- There must be a management or business problem requiring a solution - too
often expert systems are 'solutions looking for problems'.
- A rigorous feasibility study must be undertaken prior to any major
development project.
- Quick, inexpensive prototyping of systems can, at an early stage, greatly
enhance the understanding of management, experts, and projected users.
- Where possible, existing expert systems developments, methods and
techniques should be used rather than inventing new ones.
- It is crucial for the purposes of development and maintenance, to record and
document the knowledge held within a system in some schematic form, usually
as "knowledge base maps".
- Conventional data processing skills can and should be regularly used in the
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course of developing expert systems in law.
- A fundamental, theoretical, jurisprudential understanding of the law on the
part of developers greatly increases the likelihood of the development of reliable
systems.
- Once in operation, the performance and organisation fit of systems must
frequently be monitored.
- The expectations of management, experts and users must be managed most
carefully and developers must not fall foul of 'the fallacy of the successful first
step'.
- A system will only be used profitably if there is the commitment of senior
management, of domain experts and of the end users.
In conclusion, it is generally anticipated that the 1990swill be the decade during
which artificial intelligence technologies begin to deliver substantial business
benefits. Given careful and sufficient investment, the administration of the law-
both in the public and private sectors - is an area of particular promise. The public
administration of the law and the provision of private legal services is inherently
knowledge based and so is especially amenable to AI and expert systems treatment;
for these technologies strive precisely to support and enhance knowledge
processing tasks.
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